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Survived  -  In-Flight Breakup

All would be alive if this aircraft had a “Low Thrust Detector”

Reprinted from Aviation Safety, April 15, 1990 

A 14,500 hr ATP Air Taxi pilot has a partial engine failure and retards the wrong throttle.  Killing himself and four of six passengers!

 

Puzzle Palace    It's drilled into a pilot during multiengine training and check flights that an engine failure on takeoff must be handled quickly and methodically. One point given special emphasis is the Importance of feathering the propeller to reduce drag. Most piston twins will neither climb nor maintain altitude with the prop on the 'dead' engine wind-milling.

But to accomplish this critical task the pilot first has to determine which engine is the dead one. It's easier said than done. In a textbook scenario. the pilot will by reflex be holding full rudder to counter the yaw produced by asymmetric thrust from the good engine and by drag from the bad one and use the mnemonic 'dead foot: dead engine' to Identify the one that's failed.

It works just fine most of the time when an instructor or check pilot simulates an engine failure. But it isn’t always that simple in the real world, where a pilot probably Isn’t expecting an engine problem, where an aircraft being bounced around in turbulence can make identification of the dead engine a conundrum, where a propeller over-speed could fool a pilot into thinking a perfectly good engine has given up the ghost. 

Which One?    It was still dark at 6 a.m. when the pilot taxied his Piper Chieftain and six passengers to take off from Runway 1 at Kenai Municipal. The weather there was cruddy VMC, with scattered clouds at 300 feet, a measured 1,500 overcast and six miles of visibility in light rain and fog. The flight was cleared direct to Anchorage. IFR at 3.000 feet.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot radioed, “Central One has lost an engine and we're circling for one. “Witnesses saw the aircraft turn onto downwind for Runway 1 and begin descending from an altitude of only 300 to 600 feet. One of the surviving passengers would later recall hearing the left engine backfire loudly on takeoff. The other survivor would say he heard a sound he thought was an engine blowing up but could not say for sure which one it was. 

The Chieftain descended wings-level into trees and then crashed inverted into a house about a half mile west of the airport, where it exploded and burned. There were two people inside the house, but they escaped with minor injuries. Only two of the seven people aboard the aircraft survived.

The flaps were found nearly fully lowered, and NTSB's report indicates that investigators explored the possibility that the pilot may have taken off with full flaps. The Board concluded, however, that he most likely took off without flaps but lowered them at the last moment in an attempt to cushion the impact.

The investigation also disclosed that although (he Lycoming TIO-540 engines were producing power when the aircraft crashed. both of them had mechanical problems. The left engine had severely worn camshaft lobes, a condition that would sap some power. However, neither NTSB nor Textron-Lycoming was able to determine how much actually would have been lost. 

Cracked Head    The right engine was in worse shape. NTSB said there was a pre-existing crack in the cylinder head that stretched halfway around the barrel of the number three cylinder. This crack opened up during the ill‑fated takeoff, causing the intake manifold to separate and vent the compressed air supplied by the turbocharger. The Board determined that this rendered the right engine capable of producing only 193 of its maximum rated 350 horsepower.

It appears, then, that although the left engine was down on power, it was in fact producing substantially more power than the right engine. The Board believes, however, that the pilot, like one of the surviving passengers may have thought it was the left engine that was backfiring and purposely reduced power on the left engine substantially “in a mistaken effort to control the engine and lessen the damage." With the right engine able to produce only 55 percent of its maximum rated power and the left engine throttled back, the aircraft was no longer capable of maintaining altitude. NTSB said.

The Board's theory is supported by the position of the rudder trim tab. With the right engine producing some power and the left one throttled back, the Chieftain would have yawed to the left and the pilot would have needed right rudder to counteract it. The trim tab was found fully deflected to a position that would have helped the pilot maintain right rudder.

NTSB concluded that the cracked cylinder head on the right engine was a probable cause of the accident. In its own formal terms, the Board also determined that during the few seconds that elapsed between the pilot's takeoff announcement and the Chieftain's descent, the pilot was presented with a puzzle he was unable to solve.